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Since the AKP came to power under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, historical 
paradigms of power have shifted in Turkey. Whereas power was previously effectively 
dispersed into several institutions that competed in a system with checks and balances, the 
current Turkish political system no longer contains traditional restraints on executive 
power. The former parliamentary system has been transformed under the tutelage of the 
AKP and the 2017 constitutional referendum into an executive-style presidential system 
which eroded key competing institutions for power. Institutions such as the parliamentary 
system, the judiciary, and the military previously constrained executive power, but today 
their capacities to offer checks to the executive have eroded to the point of being 
ineffective. Under President Erdogan, the AKP has transformed the Turkish political 
system and consolidated power in a manner unprecedented in the modern history of the 
republic. From a razor-thin majority of the popular vote, the AKP utilized state institutions 
to fundamentally reshape the Turkish political system to ensure their political survival and 
to keep President Erdogan in power for the foreseeable future. 
 vi 
This paper analyzes the impact of Erdogan’s concentration of power on the Turkish 
political system. At the core of this analysis are two issues: the use of state institutions to 
consolidate power, and the characterization of these changes, both domestically and 
abroad. How does Erdogan utilize state institutions to systematically consolidate executive 
power in Turkey and how does this inform the broader study of authoritarian regimes? 
Drawing upon theories of authoritarianism and contemporary literature on Turkey, this 
paper explores how Erdogan consolidates power in the presidency using EU-endorsed 
reforms, constitutional referendums, and purges and how he reconstructs basic paradigms 
in civil-military relations in Turkey in his role as commander-in-chief. As this paper 
demonstrates, “democratic” reforms in Turkey were weaponized to erode competing 
institutions for power and to eliminate potential checks on the executive.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Since the AKP came to power under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, 
historical paradigms of power have shifted in Turkey. Whereas power was previously 
effectively dispersed into several institutions that competed in a system with checks and 
balances, the current Turkish political system no longer contains traditional restraints on 
executive power. The former parliamentary system has been transformed under the tutelage 
of the AKP and the 2017 constitutional referendum into an executive-style presidential 
system which eroded key competing institutions for power. Institutions such as the 
parliamentary system, the judiciary, and the military previously constrained executive 
power, but today their capacities to offer checks to the executive have eroded to the point 
of being ineffective. As evidenced in the failed coup attempt in 2016, the government 
withstood a coup attempt by the military and instigated a popular uprising that ultimately 
defeated the soldiers in the streets.  
Under President Erdogan, the AKP has transformed the Turkish political system 
and consolidated power in a manner unprecedented in the modern history of the republic.  
Critically, Erdogan and the AKP have initiated these changes while winning the support of 
only half the public. Despite increasing its electoral margins of victory and enjoying a 
majority in parliament since 2002, the AKP’s best electoral performance was in 2011 when 
the party won 49.8 percent of the vote.1 In the 2014 presidential election, the first to feature 
direct election by the people, Prime Minister Erdogan netted 51.7 percent of the vote,2 and 
this remains the singular electoral victory to crack the elusive fifty percent mark. From a 
razor-thin majority of the popular vote, the AKP utilized state institutions to fundamentally 
                                                 
1 Soner Cagaptay, The New Sultan: Erdogan and the Crisis of Modern Turkey (New York: I.B. Tauris & 
Co. Ltd, 2017), 192. 
2 Steven A. Cook. “How Erdogan Made Turkey Authoritarian Again.” The Atlantic, July 21, 2016. 
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reshape the Turkish political system and to keep President Erdogan in power for the 
foreseeable future. As part of ensuring their political survival, the AKP and Erdogan have 
concentrated power in the executive and have stripped rival branches of the government 
and the military of powers that could create obstacles in their path. Following the passing 
of the 2017 constitutional referendum, Erdogan formally assumes a series of offices with 
newly vested powers including president (in an executive-style presidency) and 
commander-in-chief (in direct control of the Turkish Armed Forces).  
This paper analyzes the impact of Erdogan’s concentration of power on the Turkish 
political system. At the core of this analysis are two issues: the use of state institutions to 
consolidate power, and the characterization of these changes, both domestically and 
abroad. How does Erdogan utilize state institutions to systematically consolidate executive 
power in Turkey and how does this inform the broader study of authoritarian regimes? 
Drawing upon theories of authoritarianism and contemporary literature on Turkey, this 
paper explores how Erdogan consolidates power in the presidency and how he reconstructs 
basic paradigms in civil-military relations in Turkey in his role as commander-in-chief. 
This paper discusses power consolidation as a lateral transfer of authorities from multiple 
competing institutions for power into a singular domain, in this case the executive, that 
manifests in distinct structural shifts that exceed changes in norms of political power. Since 
coming to power in 2003, Erdogan has held two positions in the executive: prime minister 
and president, and his efforts to transform the Turkish political system both redefined those 
roles and collapsed their authorities into an executive-style presidency.  
Under Erdogan’s leadership, the AKP has consolidated power in the executive from 
the parliamentary system, the judiciary, and the military by systematically exploiting three 
methods of change: European Union-endorsed reforms, constitutional referendums, and 
purges, to increase their political power and to weaken checks and balances on the 
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government. Successive electoral victories and the ten-percent national threshold in 
elections for opposition parties to earn seats give the AKP lopsided and unrepresentative 
majorities in parliament, which the party has interpreted as carte blanche to enforce their 
agenda. Early efforts to bring the military under civilian control were strongly encouraged 
by the European Union as part of Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership, without taking 
into consideration the possible consequences of eroding the independence of the Turkish 
Armed Forces.  
At its core, Erdogan’s voting base is largely made up of conservatives and political 
Islamists boosted by the economic growth delivered by the AKP since 2003. All other 
segments of the Turkish electorate: secularists/Kemalists, liberals, social democrats, 
leftists, and Kurds, have been demonized and played off of each other to divide the 
opposition.3 As the country grows more polarized under Erdogan’s particular style of 
suppressing opposition, the pro-Erdogan and opposition camps continue to fight for the 
majority in elections, and the tight margin of victory for the “yes” vote in the 2017 
constitutional referendum reinforces both the extreme polarization and the necessity for 
Erdogan to utilize every state institution at his disposal to repress the opposition and to 
ensure his political survival.  
The combined effect of this convergence is a Turkish political system that has 
hollowed out its traditional Kemalism core and has concentrated power in a single party 
and single leader at levels unprecedented since the introduction of a multiparty system in 
Turkey in 1950. Key institutions that once checked executive power are no longer capable 
of withstanding Erdogan’s agenda. Principally, this paper focuses on the parliamentary 
system, the judiciary, and the military as institutions competing with the executive for 
                                                 
3 Soner Cagaptay and Oya Rose Aktas. “How Erdoganism Is Killing Turkish Democracy.” Foreign Affairs, 
July 7, 2017. 
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power. According to Soner Cagaptay, Director of the Turkish Research Program at the 
Washington Institute, Turkey has historically had three checks on government power: the 
courts, the media, and the military,4 whereas, Berk Esen and Sebnem Gumuscu argue the 
military and judiciary are the two veto powers entrenched in the Turkish political system.5 
The scope of this paper reflects the analysis of both authors, however it focuses on the 
judiciary and the military as well as the parliamentary system to demonstrate the steps 
taken to consolidate power both into the executive and within the executive. This paper 
will not address the Erdogan and the AKP’s concentration of power with relation to the 
media.6 
As historical checks on government power, the judiciary and the military played a 
role in removing several previous governments. The building blocks of the 1997 “soft 
coup,” which removed a coalition government led by an Islamist party, were the military 
and the high courts.7 More broadly, “the AKP’s genealogy included four parties that had 
been closed as a result of either a coup or a court order, and Erdogan was determined to 
never allow his party to meet the same fate.”8 The key institutions representing checks and 
balances on government power were significant not only because of their utility in 
characterizing the Turkish political system, but also because they functioned as a target list 
for Erdogan and the AKP once they came to power. Their political survival depended on 
their capacity to placate or weaken the institutions capable of overthrowing them and this 
informed their efforts to undermine the judiciary and the military.   
                                                 
4 Cagaptay, The New Sultan, 126.  
5 Berk Esen and Sebnam Gumuscu. “Turkey: How the Coup Failed.” Journal of Democracy 28, no. 
Number 1 (January 2017): 60. 
6 For more on Erdogan and the media, see: Media in New Turkey: The Origins of an Authoritarian 
Neoliberal State by Bilge Yesil. 
7 Cagaptay, The New Sultan, 120. 
8 Cook, “How Erdogan Made Turkey Authoritarian Again.” The Atlantic, July 21, 2016. 
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Currently, the discussion of authoritarianism in Turkey exists in several separate 
spheres. Among authors in comparative politics, there is a debate about the larger trends in 
authoritarianism and whether specific countries represent a global backsliding of 
democracy. Larry Diamond argues, in contrast to Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, that 
several countries represent the beginning of decline in global democracy and that Turkey 
in particular shows “a stunning and increasingly audacious concentration of personal power 
[by Erdogan] … The abuse and personalization of power and the concentration of 
competitive space and freedom in Turkey have been subtle and incremental, moving with 
nothing like the speed of Putin in the early 2000s. But by now, these trends appear to have 
crossed a threshold, pushing the country below the minimum standards of democracy.”9 
Levitsky and Way counter that a systematic breakdown of authoritarianism in the 1990s 
after the demise of communism was commonly conflated with democratization, and this 
misperception falsely leads to claims of democracy backsliding.10  
More recently, Levitsky and Ziblatt argue Turkey exemplifies democratic 
breakdown caused not by generals but by elected leaders who “subvert the very process 
that brought them to power.”11 Furthermore, “Since the end of the Cold War, most 
democratic breakdowns have been caused not by generals and soldiers but by elected 
governments themselves. Like Chavez in Venezuela, elected leaders have subverted 
democratic institutions in Georgia, Hungary, Nicaragua, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, 
Russia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Ukraine. Democratic backsliding today begins at the ballot 
box.”12 Principally, this body of scholarship characterizes Turkey along the democratic-
                                                 
9 Larry Diamond. “Facing Up to the Democratic Recession.” Journal of Democracy 26, no. 1 (2015): 146. 
10 Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. “The Myth of Democratic Recession.” Journal of Democracy 26, no. 1 
(2015): 49. 
11 Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt. How Democracies Die. New York: Crown, 2018, 3. 
12 Levitsky and Ziblatt, How Democracies Die, 5. 
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authoritarian spectrum and includes references to Turkey as “competitive 
authoritarianism”13 or “electoral authoritarianism,”14 and uses Turkey as evidence of larger 
trends in authoritarianism.  
The work of Diamond and Levitsky and Way is cited in Soner Capagtay’s The New 
Sultan, a book that arises out a second body of literature: the writings of scholars on Turkey. 
Capagtay along with Steven Cook of the Council on Foreign Relations write prolifically in 
response to daily events in Turkey and this literature more narrowly focuses on explaining 
changes in Turkey within the context of its history and political, social, and cultural 
paradigms. This paper seeks to bridge the gap between the theoretical debates on 
authoritarianism and the timely writings responding to events in Turkey to explore the 
manner in which the Turkish political system has evolved since the AKP came to power in 
2002. While principally focused on Turkey, the implications of the Turkish case inform 
the broader study of authoritarianism. The Turkish example demonstrates how 
“democratic” reforms were weaponized to erode competing institutions for power and to 
eliminate potential checks on the government. In appearing to democratize, as discussed at 
length in the literature published in the early AKP years on the “Turkish model” for 
democracy in the Middle East,15 the AKP actually moved to diminish the political influence 
of the military, thereby reducing the military’s capacity to unseat their government.  
The structure of this paper is as follows: first, Chapter 2 details how Erdogan shifted 
authorities from the parliamentary system (including the executive and legislative 
                                                 
13 Berk Esen and Sebnem Gumuscu. “Rising Competitive Authoritarianism in Turkey.” Third World 
Quarterly 37, no. 9 (September 1, 2016): 1581–1606. 
Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
14 David White and Marc Herzog. “Examining State Capacity in the Context of Electoral Authoritarianism, 
Regime Formation and Consolidation in Russia and Turkey.” Journal of Southeast European & Black Sea 
Studies 16, no. 4 (December 2016): 551–69. 
15 Altunisik, Meliha Benli. “The Turkish Model and Democratization in the Middle East.” Arab Studies 
Quarterly 27, no. 1/2 (2005): 45–63. 
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branches) and the judiciary into the executive. Chapter 3 examines how Erdogan 
systematically eroded the political influence of the military, ultimately built a government 
that could withstand a coup attempt, and fundamentally reordered civil-military relations 
to bring the military under direct civilian rule and to create a position as commander in 
chief. The final chapter summarizes the consolidation of power conducted by Erdogan 
through EU reforms, constitutional referendums, and purges and highlights the need to 
reexamine “democratizing” characterizations of Erdogan’s early steps to bring the Turkish 



















Chapter 2: Mr. President 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan has ruled Turkey since 2003, first as prime minister and 
currently as president. Under his leadership the parliamentary system in which he first 
came to power has been transformed into a presidential system formerly unknown in the 
history of the Turkish Republic. As the Justice and Development Party, the AKP, won 
successive parliamentary elections in 2002, 2007, and 2011, the AKP grew to dominate 
Turkish politics and its charismatic party leader occupied the country’s highest political 
office for eleven-and-a-half years. According to Turkey’s parliamentary system, as head 
of the majority party Erdogan was prime minister and head of the government, but not head 
of state as that role was delegated to the president, a figure often described as 
“ceremonial.”16 The president has traditionally held limited executive power in comparison 
to the prime minister, however the presidency is the most coveted position in the Turkish 
system because it was the office held by Ataturk.17 Constrained by term limits under 
Turkish law and nearing the conclusion of his third term as prime minister, Erdogan 
announced he was running for president in the 2014 election and promptly won 52 percent 
of the vote.18  
Prior to the 2014 presidential election, the president was chosen by parliament, and 
the people did not directly elect their head of state. After a period of deadlock between the 
Turkish Armed Forces and the AKP over their nomination of Foreign Minister Abdullah 
Gul for President in 2007, early elections helped AKP win a landslide victory and they 
succeeded in naming Abdullah Gul as President of Turkey. Later that year, a constitutional 
referendum was held to introduce direct presidential election by popular vote and thereby 
                                                 
16 “Erdogan: Turkey’s Pugnacious President.” BBC News, April 17, 2017. 
17 Cagaptay, The New Sultan, 140. 
18 Steven A. Cook. “Turkey’s Identity Crisis.” The Atlantic, June 25, 2017. 
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prevent future parliamentary deadlocks over presidential elections.19 When it passed, it also 
amended the presidential term from seven years to five years and allowed the re-election 
of a president for a second term. Given that President Gul has just been elected to a seven-
year term, the first presidential election under the new system took place in 2014 and 
despite the Constitutional Court ruling in favor of President Gul’s eligibility to run for a 
second, five-year term, he stepped aside for Erdogan.20  
This 2007 constitutional referendum changes allowed Erdogan to become the first 
directly elected President of Turkey and to increase the legitimacy of the office through its 
newfound connection to the popular vote. At the height of his popularity in 2014, Erdogan 
won over 50 percent of the vote in the first ballot, thereby avoiding an anticipated second 
round.21 As Erdogan assumed his new role as head of the state, thereby surrendering his 
position as head of the party and head of the government, the question arose as to the extent 
to which his informal power and prestige accumulated during his tenure as prime minister 
would transfer to his new role which offered drastically fewer formal authorities.22 
The steps taken by Erdogan to reconstruct the power of the office of the presidency 
challenged basic paradigms and structural aspects of the Turkish Republic and reshaped 
the political order from a parliamentary system into an executive-style presidency where 
the offices of the prime minister and presidency collapsed into one. How did Erdogan and 
the AKP systematically consolidate power from the prime ministry, parliament, and 
judiciary into the office of the presidency? And how did they succeed in consolidating 
power from institutions designed to offer checks and balances to executive power? The 
                                                 
19 Serdar Karagoz. “The 2017 Constitutional Referendum in Turkey.” Daily Sabah Centre for Policy 
Studies, April 2017, 5. 
20 Cagaptay, The New Sultan, 140. 
21 Cagaptay, The New Sultan, 141. 
22 Steven A. Cook. “Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Turkey’s Executive President.” Council on Foreign Relations, 
January 17, 2017. 
 10 
AKP eroded a system of checks and balances to consolidate power under President 
Erdogan by incrementally weakening the independence of the judiciary through reforms 
and purges and by systematically formulating packages of constitutional amendments that 
would formally undermine the separation of powers. The long-term campaign using state 
institutions to consolidate power altered all branches in the Turkish political system and 
began under the EU-endorsed “democratic” reforms enacted early in the AKP’s tenure as 
the ruling majority party. These efforts were successful due in part to widespread and 
increasingly systemic repression that escalated to the levels witnessed since the 2016 failed 
coup attempt that affected military officers, members of parliament, judges, teachers, civil 
servants, and university faculty. After fifteen years in power, the political system under 
President Erdogan has undergone a massive transformation and no longer resembles the 
political system he inherited in 2003.  
This chapter argues President Erdogan and the AKP utilized and manipulated the 
2017 constitutional referendum to formally restructure the Turkish Republic and to 
consolidate power from the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of the 
government into the office he holds, the office of the presidency. Collectively, the 
constitutional amendments endorse an executive presidency system designed with the 
continued rule of President Erdogan and the AKP in mind. Critically, these changes appear 
tailored to the rule of President Erdogan and the AKP.  His success in implementing an 
executive-style presidency achieves one of Erdogan’s end goals and helps to define the 
legacy he has crafted. 
 
 11 
CAMPAIGNING FOR CHANGE 
Despite winning successive elections and undermining competing institutions for 
power, the AKP and Erdogan have some limits to their control over a political system in 
which the AKP has failed to carry 50 percent of the popular vote in any election. Soner 
Cagaptay characterizes the problem of Erdoganism as “although half of Turkey adores 
Erdogan, the other half loathes him. Since Erdoganism delegitimizes all the opposition, 40 
million of Turkey’s 80 million inhabitants are left on the outside.”23 This extreme 
polarization partly explains the need for the AKP to build its voting base by creating 
coalitions with other political groups: the Gulenists, the Kemalists, or any group capable 
of generating sufficient public support for AKP to enact their agenda. In the absence of an 
absolute majority, the AKP and Erdogan must operate within the political system and 
manipulate it to achieve their goals. 
The long campaign to establish an executive-style presidency enacted under a 
package of constitutional reforms demonstrates how the AKP and Erdogan consolidate 
their power despite systemic constraints. In an October 2011 announcement, then Prime 
Minister Erdogan stated that Turkey would have a new constitution within a year, however 
by 2013, the interparty parliamentary committee tasked with writing the new constitution 
was deadlocked.24 Despite winning the 2011 parliamentary election by their highest margin 
to date, the AKP faced sufficient parliamentary opposition to their proposed constitutional 
reforms and Erdogan was forced to refocus his strategy. Instead of writing a new document 
as an interparty parliamentary committee, “Erdogan set his sights on a constitution written 
by the AKP. In order to get it passed, however, he needed to reinforce his parliamentary 
                                                 
23 Soner Cagaptay and Oya Rose Aktas. “How Erdoganism Is Killing Turkish Democracy.” Foreign 
Affairs, July 7, 2017. 
24 Steven A. Cook. “RIP Turkey, 1921 – 2017.” Foreign Policy, April 16, 2017. 
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majority.”25 When the two generals elections in 2015 failed to secure for AKP the 
necessary 367 seats out of the 550-member parliament to allow the party to ratify a 
constitution without the public’s input, Erdogan settled for amending the constitution by 
means of a constitutional referendum.26  
When voters cast ballots in the April 2017 constitutional referendum, their input 
reflected the limited but not total control the AKP and Erdogan held over the Turkish 
political system. Whereas they aspired to ratify a new constitution of their own design, 
after facing setbacks in parliamentary deadlock and insufficient parliamentary majorities, 
Erdogan maneuvered to keep the aspiration of an executive-style presidency alive and 
settled for a constitutional referendum. The achievement of a formal restructuring of 
executive power was made possible by vast repressive measures against the “no” campaign 
to manipulate the referendum. As part of the “yes” campaign, Erdogan “harnessed the 
power of the state to crush the Noes,”27 and targeted a main proponent of the “no” 
campaign: Selahattin Demirtas. In 2015, Mr. Demirtas, co-leader of the pro-Kurdish HDP 
party, told Erdogan that he would never get his new constitution and Erdogan responded 
by disowning the peace process and thereby ending a two-year ceasefire with the PKK. 
During the run-up to the 2017 constitutional referendum, Mr. Demirtas was arrested on 
terror charges that carry a potential sentence of 142 years in prison. A Kurdish-language 
song supporting the “no” campaign was banned and campaign coverage on national 
television channels devoted 90 percent of airtime to the “yes” campaign.28 
While limited by less-than-absolute parliamentary majorities and a support base of 
only roughly half the country, Erdogan and the AKP have succeeded in fundamentally 
                                                 
25 Cook, “RIP Turkey, 1921 – 2017.” Foreign Policy, April 16, 2017. 
26 Cook, “RIP Turkey, 1921 – 2017.” Foreign Policy, April 16, 2017. 
27 “The Vote That Will Determine the Fate of Turkey’s Democracy.” The Economist, April 15, 2017. 
28 “The Vote That Will Determine the Fate of Turkey’s Democracy.” The Economist, April 15, 2017. 
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undermining the balance of powers embedded in the political system through a 
combination of constitutional amendments systematically eroding competing institutions, 
repression, and mass purges of the judiciary. Despite utilizing the full power of the state to 
manipulate the 2017 constitutional referendum, the “yes” vote only passed by a small 
margin. When the changes come into effect in 2019, Erdogan and the AKP will have even 
more resources at their disposal to push through their agenda and even fewer institutions 
capable of challenging them.  
 
RESTRUCTURING THE REPUBLIC 
The “yes” and “no” campaigns regarding the 2017 constitutional referendum 
painted very different pictures of the Turkish Republic. According to the AKP, the 
proposed amendments would protect Turkey from the sort of fractious coalition politics 
that hampered the nation’s growth in the 1990s, both in terms of its economy and its 
position as a preeminent regional power.29 Opponents to the changes warned of growing 
authoritarianism and autocracy with power concentrated in one person, President Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan.30 When the “yes” campaign prevailed with 51.3 percent of the vote, the 
effect was a significant expansion of the powers of the nation’s top office and a 
transformation of the Turkish Republic from a parliamentary system to an executive 
presidency.31  
While maintaining elements of democratic governance such as a popularly elected 
president and parliament and a formally independent judiciary, the new political system in 
reality represents a dismantling of existing checks and balances within the system and an 
                                                 
29 Orhan Corskun and Nick Tattersall. “Turkey Shifts to Presidential System, Even without Constitutional 
Change.” Reuters, May 23, 2016. 
30 Henri Barkey. “Turkey Will Never Be the Same after This Vote.” Washington Post, April 11, 2017. 
31 Umut Uras. “‘Yes’ Vote Leads in Turkey Constitution Referendum,” Al-Jazeera. April 16, 2017. 
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erosion of competing institutions for power in favor of the presidency. President Erdogan 
and the AKP utilized and manipulated the 2017 constitutional referendum to formally 
restructure the Turkish Republic and to consolidate power from the executive, legislative, 
and judiciary branches of the government into the office he holds, the office of the 
presidency. Collectively, the constitutional amendments endorse an executive presidency 
system designed with the continued rule of President Erdogan and the AKP in mind.  
When the 18 constitutional amendments approved in the referendum come into 
effect in 2019, they will revise or repeal 76 articles of the Turkish constitution.32 The broad 
reaching changes affect the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches as well as the 
nature of democratic governance in Turkey. In the 1921 Law on Fundamental 
Organization, the Turkish Grand National Assembly disseminated the absolute authority 
of the Ottoman sultan into executive and legislative branches in an effort to modernize and 
transition out of dynastic rule.33 Including the 2017 vote, there have been seven 
constitutional referendums since Turkey’s transition from single-party rule to multi-party 
system in 1946. The current constitution dates to 1982, two years after Turkey’s third coup 
in 1980, and was amended three times by popular vote and 15 times through legislative 
action in the period since 1982.34  
Given the frequency of constitutional reform, what makes this latest change 
unprecedented in the history of the Turkish Republic? In shifting from a parliamentary 
system to a presidential system, this constitutional referendum closes a chapter of history 
that predates the establishment of the Turkish Republic and it fundamentally changes the 
distribution of powers between branches of the government established under Ataturk. 
                                                 
32 Sinan Ekim and Kemal Kirişci. “The Turkish Constitutional Referendum, Explained.” Brookings, April 
13, 2017. 
33 Cook, “RIP Turkey, 1921 – 2017.” Foreign Policy, April 16, 2017. 
34 Ekim and Kirişci, “The Turkish Constitutional Referendum, Explained.” Brookings, April 13, 2017. 
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According to the 2017 changes, if the president’s party controls a critical number of seats 
in parliament, the institution ceases to function as an independent check on his agenda and 
becomes merely a “rubber-stamp.”35 The independence of the institution directly correlates 
to the composition of the parliament. The following is an examination of how each branch 
of government was eroded as part of the effort by the AKP and Erdogan to consolidate 
power using state institutions. 
 
The Executive Branch 
Among the amendments to the executive branch are a number of changes 
fundamentally restructuring the executive. First, the duties of the prime minister will be 
subsumed under the office of the president, and the prime ministry will be abolished under 
the new system, formally transforming the parliamentary system into a presidential one. 
This merger is the single most significant structural change in the package of constitutional 
amendments, and it demonstrates that the president would retain the powers afforded by 
his office and substantially increase his authorities with the addition of the powers granted 
to the prime minister.36 Within the executive branch alone there are considerable power 
consolidations that shift powers formerly dispersed into a single office.  
Secondly, the merging of the prime ministry and presidency removes a requirement 
that the president be neutral and exist above party politics and allows the president to 
assume the powers of the head of the government and the head of the state.37 Previously, 
the president was prohibited from retaining direct ties to a political party as the 1982 
                                                 
35 Ekim and Kirişci, “The Turkish Constitutional Referendum, Explained.” Brookings, April 13, 2017. 
36 Alan Makovsky. “Erdoğan’s Proposal for an Empowered Presidency.” Center for American Progress, 
March 22, 2017. 
37 Ekim and Kirişci, “The Turkish Constitutional Referendum, Explained.” Brookings, April 13, 2017. 
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Turkish Constitution stipulated the presidency was a non-partisan post.38 This modification 
represents a major break from Turkish tradition that nullifies “the notion of the presidency 
as a symbol of national unity set above political parties.”39 Upon assuming the presidency 
in 2014, President Erdogan was forced to relinquish control of the AKP despite having 
long supported a party-affiliated presidency.40 This change permits the president to 
maintain direct ties to a political party, and to therefore rule as the head of a political party, 
the head of the government, and the head of the state, three positions that were purposefully 
separated under the old parliamentary system.41  
The most significant new authority granted to the executive by the constitutional 
amendments, beyond the powers inherent in the presidency and prime ministry, is the 
president’s right to issue a decree with the force of law. Under the changes, the president 
has the power to issue decrees on political, social, and economic issues that carry the full 
force of law, which effectively grants the president legislative power, albeit limited.42 The 
amendments limit the scope of legislative power afforded to the president in several ways. 
Presidential decrees cannot “contradict the fundamental and civil rights and responsibilities 
enshrined in the constitution,” nor can the president “overturn existing laws or decree a law 
in an issue… where law by the parliament is required. If a decree contradicts the law, the 
law takes precedence, and the parliament could pass laws that override presidential 
decrees.”43 However, if a presidential decree overstepped and parliament had the votes to 
overrule a decree, there would still likely be a period of time in which the decree would 
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remain in force while the legislative process was responding to the decree.44 While 
theoretically limiting the scope of the president’s newfound legislative power, any scenario 
where the president’s party enjoys a significant majority of seats in parliament 
compromises the capacity of parliament to effectively check executive power in 
presidential decrees, blurring the line between branches and eliminating the exclusive 
authority of parliament to legislate.  
Additionally, the package of constitutional amendments creates a new office in the 
executive branch in the form of a vice presidency. According to the changes, the president 
will have the power to appoint one or multiple vice presidents, as well as “the power to 
establish and/or abolish ministries, appoint ministers and other senior officials—all of 
whom would operate without being subject to any legislative or judicial review, and would 
be accountable only to the president.”45 Previously, the Grand National Assembly held a 
vote of confidence on cabinet ministers and the change eliminates that oversight power. As 
part of the right to establish or eliminate ministries, the president would set their authorities, 
responsibilities, and structure in addition to making all executive branch personnel 
appointments.46  
While the president is limited to two five-year terms, the constitutional amendments 
offer an exception that could afford a third term to a president. When the new system 
outlined in the constitutional amendments comes into force in 2019, there will be joint 
parliamentary and presidential elections and despite already having completed a five-year 
term as president, Erdogan is expected to be deemed eligible for run for two more five-
year terms under the new system.47 The decision on his eligibility to run will likely be up 
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to the Constitutional Court, of which the majority of judges have been appointed by 
Erdogan or his successor, a fellow founding member of the AKP. Given the pro-Erdogan 
court, it is likely that he would be allowed to stay in power, assuming he wins the popular 
vote, until 2029.48 However, should parliament call for early elections near the middle of 
his last year in office, he would be eligible under the constitutional amendments to run for 
another five-year term, thus potentially staying in power until 2034.49 The possibility of a 
third term beyond the fifteen years he has already served as Turkey’s head of government 
and head of state would be unprecedented in Turkish republican history.  
Collectively the changes made to the executive branch consolidate power in the 
presidency at levels novel to the modern Turkish republic. New authorities are granted to 
the executive that formerly were vested in parliament and the courts, thereby weakening 
the capacity of parliamentary and judiciary oversight to check the executive’s agenda, and 
offices within the executive were collapsed into the position President Erdogan currently 
holds. The proposed schedule of implementation significantly advantages the incumbent 
and reinforces the notion that these changes were designed with the continued rule of the 
AKP and President Erdogan in mind.  
 
The Legislative Branch 
The Grand National Assembly in Turkey was established to assume executive and 
legislative powers in 1920, three years prior to the establishment of the Turkish Republic, 
and it has formed 65 governments in 93 years.50 The high rate at which it forms 
governments alludes to systemic instability caused by successive military interventions, 
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inefficient coalition politics, and a historic preference to call for early elections. The “yes” 
campaign presented the constitutional amendment package as a means to resolve this 
fragmentation and to ensure stability and more effective governance by amending a series 
of articles relating to the parliament. However, these changes directly consolidate power 
into the executive. 
As alluded to above, the constitutional amendments grant the president the right to 
issue decrees, and while that power is considerable but not unlimited, it does reduce the 
centrality of the parliament in its role as the ultimate law-making body.51 Another 
significant change affects Article 76 and the composition of the Grand National Assembly 
by increasing the number of seats from 550 to 600. When the number of deputies was last 
increased in 1995, the move raised the number of seats from 450 to 550 to reflect Turkey’s 
growing population and to attempt to maintain a lower ratio of population per deputy seen 
in many European Union countries. Since 1995, Turkey’s population has increased from 
roughly 59 million to 79 million, and more importantly, its number of registered voters has 
grown from approximately 29 million to 58 million, essentially doubling in size in twenty 
years.52 The move to increase the number of seats and to thereby adjust the number of 
deputies to reflect changing demographics was touted by the “yes” campaign as a measure 
to make the legislative branch more representative of the electorate,53 however the ten 
percent national threshold rule remains and when acting together the increase in seats and 
constraint on which parties participate in the Grand National Assembly create the opposite 
effect.  
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Depending on how and which electoral districts are narrowed, the increase in 
deputies may not correlate to greater representation. The current requirement for a political 
party to capture ten percent of the vote to earn representation in parliament, known as the 
ten percent national electoral threshold, was enacted by authorities after the 1980 coup to 
keep marginal parties out of parliament, thereby reducing fragmented politics.54 In effect, 
the ten-percent threshold has created for the AKP “lopsided and unrepresentative majorities 
in the legislature,”55 because the seats that would go to the minority party are redistributed 
proportionately, and as the majority party the AKP is the main beneficiary.56 If redistricting 
favors the incumbent AKP party then the additional seats would likely be filled by a 
disproportionately higher number of AKP deputies. Alternatively, redistricting could be 
used to repress the number of seats earned by opposition parties thereby making it more 
difficult for them to meet the ten percent national threshold or by increasing the obstacles 
they would face in translating their votes into seats. There is potential for a majority party 
to use the increase in seats to dilute the representation of opposition parties, and to thus 
reduce the ability of the parliament to check executive power should the majority party and 
executive share the same political affiliation.  
Additionally, the constitutional amendments revise Article 77 which sets the 
election term for the Grand National Assembly. Previously, parliamentary elections were 
to take place every four years, however the revised article expands the election term for 
parliament to five years and also stipulates that parliamentary and presidential elections 
will now be held simultaneously every five years.57 In syncing parliamentary and 
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presidential elections, the “no” campaign emphasized the move would increase the 
likelihood of voters selecting members of parliament and presidents from the same party, 
and the “yes” campaign countered that the change would promote uninterrupted stability 
by granting longer parliamentary sessions and reducing the frequency of calls for early 
elections.58 In the case of a run-off in the presidential election, the second round of voting 
would take place two weeks later and the electorate would have a choice between a 
candidate that was more likely to work harmoniously with parliament, or an alternative.59 
While this allows for a scenario in which the executive and legislative branches are 
balanced in the sense that the party enjoying a majority in parliament and the party of the 
president are different, this fuels the fragmentation and weak coalition politics that have 
made the Grand National Assembly unstable in the past.  
In effect, the syncing of parliamentary and presidential elections creates conditions 
in which voters cast two separate ballots for their leadership: one for their head of 
government and one for the party list of parliamentarians.60 When Turkish voters went to 
the polls in 2014 for the first direct election for president, they voted on their head of state 
not their head of government, in a position that was designed to be nonpartisan. Given 
AKP’s successive parliamentary victories in 2002, 2007, 2011, June 2015, and November 
2015,61 and President Erdogan’s 2014 presidential victory with 51.79 percent of the vote, 
the AKP under Erdogan is expected to continue to win elections and to create conditions 
in which the parliament serves a subservient role to the president’s mandate.  
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While the constitutional changes do not modify the president’s authority to dissolve 
parliament, they do collectively alter the incentives for both the president and the 
parliament to call for early elections. It is important to note that the authority of the 
president to dissolve parliament has never been invoked, however the president may be 
even less inclined to dissolve parliament under the new system given the requirement that 
presidential and parliamentary elections occur simultaneously.62 Both actors are mutually 
dis-incentivized because for the president to dissolve parliament he would in effect be 
dissolving his own term as well, and vice versa. Given the aforementioned changes to 
presidential terms limits, the president is significantly deterred from exercising the power 
of dissolution,63 but parliament is also deterred from calling for early elections to force a 
change in the head of government. Despite their mutual disincentives, there remains an 
imbalance in the capacity of the president and parliament to force each other into early 
elections. Whereas the president can call for early elections at any time, parliament would 
require the support of a three-fifths majority to call for early elections,64 which 
demonstrates the barriers placed on legislative checks to executive power. 
Alternatively, several amendments directly subvert parliamentary checks on 
executive power. Under the previous system in which the head of the government was the 
prime minister, parliamentarians could put questions directly to the head of the government 
and use that interface to leverage their power. With the changes, parliamentarians will not 
be able to put oral questions to leadership directly, and instead will be limited to submitting 
written questions to ministers and vice presidents, but not to the actual head of the 
government.65 This effectively “would elevate the president above legislative scrutiny—a 
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major and dramatic break from past practice,”66 and reduce the balancing power of 
parliament. Also, the oversight capabilities of the parliament on the executive are 
weakened and, in some cases, written out of the constitution. Article 87 lists the duties and 
powers of the Grand National Assembly, and whereas that list once included monitoring 
the cabinet and cabinet ministers, that oversight power has been stripped.67  
In effect, parliament no longer has a constitutional mandate to supervise the 
executive branch, and when combined with the president’s new authority to appoint 
ministers without parliamentary approval,68 the shift in power moves directly from 
parliament to the executive. Furthermore, under changes to Article 98 parliament loses its 
right to introduce motions of censure and to call for votes of no-confidence, which were 
previous tools of firing ministers and bringing an end to a government.69 Also, whereas a 
simple majority of a quorum was sufficient under Article 89 to pass a bill that the president 
had vetoed, the new constitutional standard raises the bar to an absolute majority of its 
entire membership, which under the new system is 301 votes out of 600.70 This move 
diminishes the Grand National Assembly’s capacity to legislate independent of the 
executive, and creates more systematic obstacles should they move to pass legislation that 
is not endorsed by the president. 
With respect to impeachment, changes to constitutional articles both widen the 
array of crimes for which a president would be liable for removal and increase the 
requirements parliament would need to undertake to impeach a sitting president. Currently, 
a president can only be impeached on charges of “high treason” and there are two 
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procedural steps necessary to remove a president from office: first, one-third of MPs must 
sign a petition to initiate impeachment, and second, three-quarters of MPs must vote in 
agreeance to remove the president.71 In contrast, the amended procedure expands the 
crimes liable for impeachment to include bribery corruption, theft, and generally the crimes 
that make a citizen ineligible to run for parliament, however and significantly, this list does 
not include government-related abuses of power.72  
The procedure for impeachment expands to five steps, several of which are beyond 
the purview of the Grand National Assembly. Those steps include: parliament petitioning 
for an investigation into an alleged crime with the support of an absolute majority, within 
a month of discussion parliament securing a vote of three-fifths support to move forward 
with the petition, the appointment of a 15-member commission tasked with producing a 
report, following the commission’s report parliament would need a two-thirds majority 
vote to send the president to the Supreme Court for trial, and if convicted by the Supreme 
Court, the president would be removed from office.73 While technically the president is 
now liable for more crimes, the expanded obstacles to impeachment greatly hamper the 
power of the parliament to remove a president from office, and make the institution 
dependent on judiciary support, thereby eroding its autonomy and systematic checks to 
executive power.    
Some of the changes to parliamentarians’ power are designed to separate the 
executive and legislative branches while not explicitly shifting authorities from parliament 
to the executive. The former system allowed cabinet members to serve in the Grand 
National Assembly, and under the revised constitution a legislator appointed to the cabinet 
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would have to resign his or her seat in parliament prior to taking his or her new post.74 
However, instances in which the constitutional amendments separate the branches without 
shifting power from one branch to the executive are rare.  
 
The Judicial Branch 
While building momentum for his presidency, Erdogan undertook several steps 
designed to weaken the judiciary. Historically, the judiciary is included along with the 
military and sometimes the media as key checks and balances on government power in 
Turkey,75 and this highlights the significance of his erosion of judicial autonomy. (Chapter 
3 addresses his elimination of the military’s capacity to check his power.) “The judiciary 
in Turkey has never been independent of ideological or political pressure, but neither has 
it been a broken system.”76 The toolkit utilized by the AKP and Erdogan to weaken judicial 
independence includes repeated constitutional referendums restructuring the courts and 
mass purges of prosecutors and judges unleashed following the failed July 2016 coup 
attempt. 
Disputes between the AKP and the judiciary predate the party’s 2002 electoral 
victory and are rooted in the tense historical relations between Islamist parties and the 
courts. After the Constitutional Court found the RP and FP unconstitutional, in 1998 and 
2001 respectively, for violating the secularist articles of the Constitution mandating the 
separation of religion and state, and the Court supported the 1997 military coup by banning 
the RP, 77 the AKP arose as the ideological successors to the RP and FP in a political system 
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that has proven itself hostile to Islamist agendas. While the AKP learned from the lessons 
of the RP and FP and ran on a platform that was not openly Islamist, they also understood 
the Constitutional Court to be one of only a handful of institutions capable of removing 
them from power.  
The extent to which Erdogan and the AKP viewed the courts as a threat to their 
political survival heightened in 2008, a year after they faced off against the military over 
their nomination of Abdullah Gul for President.78 The Constitutional Court in Turkey is 
“both the interpreter of the Constitution and the court that tries alleged crimes committed 
by senior officials,”79 which under the current system are largely members of the AKP. 
After the AKP successfully secured Abdullah Gul’s presidency over the military’s 
objections based on his wife’s wearing of a headscarf, the extent to which the AKP was 
openly Islamist sparked a response. In March 2008, Turkey’s chief prosecutor brought a 
case before the Constitutional Court alleging that the AKP “had become a center of anti-
secular activity and thus should be closed.”80 The high court’s verdict demonstrated that it 
had found evidence supporting the charge, but the body fell one vote short of shutting down 
the party. Ultimately, six out of eleven members of the Constitutional Court voted to close 
the AKP, the ruling majority party in power, however in the absence of a seventh vote in 
favor, the Court was unable to close the party and instead fined the AKP $20 million.81 
Unlike the RP and FP, the AKP survived an attempt by the Constitutional Court to remove 
them from power, but as the 2008 Constitutional Court case against the AKP demonstrated, 
the courts had the means to challenge Erdogan and his agenda. 
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As the Ergenekon trials drew to a close in 2010,82 Turkey held a referendum on 26 
proposed constitutional amendments presented by the AKP and Erdogan as steps to bring 
Turkey more in line with EU-member states, thereby potentially advancing Turkey’s EU 
membership. The comprehensive package of changes included amendments addressing 
gender inequality, the right to privacy, and the judiciary, and the referendum was structured 
as a single vote on the collection of changes, rather than 26 separate votes.83 The judicial 
reforms aimed to “break up the guild-like nature of the judiciary by giving elected officials 
more influence over judicial appointments,” and offered the ruling government far-
reaching influence over the courts.84 The Turkish high courts were particularly targeted by 
Erdogan because they represented a threat to his interests and his party had only recently 
narrowly avoided a shutdown by the Constitutional Court. 
Among the 2010 constitutional reforms were changes to the composition of two 
key courts in Turkey: the Constitutional Court and the High Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors. The number of judges in Turkey’s most powerful court, the Constitutional 
Court, increased from 11 to 17 and President Gul, a founding member of the AKP, was 
given the authority to select two of the new members without undergoing the legislative 
confirmation process. The High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, which provides peer 
oversight to judges and prosecutors, expanded its membership from 12 members to 34 
members, of which four new members were chosen by President Gul.85 While the jurists 
comprising these two courts historically held a dim view of egalitarian democracy,86 the 
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changes brought the judiciary further under the control of elected officials and allowed the 
AKP to staff the courts with jurists loyal to the party.  
After ending its strategic alliance with the Gulen movement,87 the AKP and 
Erdogan in 2013 faced a dramatic and widespread government corruption scandal driven 
by investigations led by elements of the police and judiciary believed to be connected to 
the Gulen movement. Altogether, 52 people connected to the AKP were arrested including 
family members of cabinet ministers, and they were charged with bribery, corruption, 
fraud, money laundering, and gold smuggling.88 “Embarrassing tapes of what appeared to 
be conversations between Erdogan and his son about managing millions of dollars of cash 
were leaked to the public in pro-Gulen dailies.”89 In retaliation, Erdogan promoted 
restrictive legislation aimed at reining in the High Council of Judges and Prosecutor’s 
autonomy and campaigned to elect pro-Erdogan judges as members of the Council in 
2014.90 “This, in turn, created the basis for an internal [Council] crackdown on judges and 
prosecutors believed to be Gulenists, or followers of the semi-secretive religious movement 
that Erdogan argued has infiltrated the judiciary and orchestrated the corruption 
allegations.”91  
Following corruption allegations against himself and his family, Erdogan demoted 
and fired many of the police chiefs, judges, and prosecutors involved in the corruption 
charges in 2013 and 2014.92 The consequences of the rupture between the AKP and the 
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Gulen movement were far-reaching and upon surviving the corruption scandal, Erdogan 
declared the Gulen movement a terrorist organization and the Gulenists became his main 
opposition and “from this point on, Erdogan and the Gulen movement waged all-out war, 
with the fight reaching its crescendo in the failed plot of July 15, 2016, in which Gulen-
aligned military officers allegedly formed the backbone of a coup d’état against 
Erdogan.”93 
In the aftermath of the failed 2016 coup attempt, Erdogan and the AKP initiated 
massive, widespread purges in both private and public sectors firing or suspended an 
estimated 130,000 people suspected of being dissidents, or more specifically, Gulenists.94 
One of the hardest hit groups was judges and prosecutors. Within a month of the failed 
coup attempt, 2,745 members of the judiciary were suspended and the government 
announced their intention to hire 5,000 new judges and prosecutors by the end of August.95 
By the April 2017 constitutional referendum that estimate had risen to 4,000 forced out in 
the purges, which is equivalent to one-third of Turkey’s 12,000 judges and prosecutors.96 
According to one judge, “‘If you purge 30 to 40 percent of the judiciary, in a sense you 
purge it all… There’s no tradition left and no knowledge left.’”97 The head of the judges’ 
union, Mustafa Karadag, said the positions were often “filled by novices who could provide 
letters of accreditation from a legal guild with links to the AKP.”98 Repeatedly, Erdogan 
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aggressively utilized political leverage to purge the judiciary in order to eliminate their 
capacity to check executive power.  
Additionally, the purges touched every level of Turkey’s legal profession from 
trainees to Turkey’s highest court. At least two judges from the Constitutional Court were 
removed.99 Since the coup attempt, the Constitutional Court has received over 100,000 
cases on behalf of people in jail or fired from their jobs, a massive and unmanageable 
increase from their typical yearly case load of 20,000 cases. Remarkably, the Constitutional 
Court has not ruled on a single application, and in refusing to hear the cases, the Court 
denies applicants grounds to appeal to a higher court such as the European Court of Human 
Rights. In politicizing the courts, Erdogan eliminates opponents using a system that people 
widely respect.100 The purges created vacancies in the judiciary for the AKP to fill at their 
discretion, but they represent one of several tactics to overhaul the political leanings of the 
judiciary. 
The 2017 constitutional referendum set out to further restructure the courts and to 
bring the courts further under the control of the government. Included in package were 
additional changes to the judiciary granting even more power to Erdogan and the AKP. 
First, the current composition and level of political influence over the High Council of 
Judges and Prosecutors will be transformed. Currently, the body has 22 members, four of 
whom are appointed by the president, and under changes to Article 159 the court will be 
downsized to 13 members. The president will retain the authority to appoint four members, 
parliament will appoint seven members, and the remaining two spots will be filled by the 
minister of justice and the minister’s deputy, two positions filled at the full discretion of 
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the president.101 The “yes” campaign argued restructuring the Council, which also oversees 
the curriculum of law students, admission in the legal profession, and promotions and 
disciplinary actions for judges and prosecutors, would give the public input in Council 
elections for the first time.102  
By formally tying the Council to elected officials and public input vis-à-vis their 
elected officials, the autonomy of the judiciary is eroded. The current system allows for 16 
of its 22 members to be elected by bodies within the legal profession.103 “Thus, the key 
body would cease to be primarily administered by the judiciary itself and would come fully 
under the sway of political appointees.”104 Effectively, six members of a smaller Council 
will be presidential appointees, increasing direct executive control over the Council by 
nearly thirty percent. Since the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors decides who works 
where and in what positions across the judiciary, “presidential dominance of the [Council] 
promotes presidential dominance of the entire judicial system,”105 thereby significantly 
eroding its capacity to check executive power.   
A similar tactic amends Article 146 and reduces the membership of the 
Constitutional Court from 17 to 15 members.106 The number of appointments made by the 
president and parliament remain unchanged, and the president and parliament will continue 
to appoint 12 members and 3 members respectively. However, the removal of two members 
from the Constitutional Court eliminates two positions formerly appointed by the military 
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court,107 and this move thereby increases the executive’s relative influence over the judicial 
body, brings the entire body under civilian control, and diminishes the influence of an 
institution competing for power.108  
When the 2017 constitutional referendum goes into effect in 2019, the president 
will have direct authority over the appointments of 18 of the 28 top-ranking members of 
the judiciary,109 and presidential appointees will not be reviewable by parliament or any 
other body.110 “If the president’s party at least has a 3/5 majority in parliament, the judiciary 
may then be entirely aligned with the executive – or, effectively, the president himself. 
Undoubtedly, this would put a huge question mark on the independence of the judiciary, 
as it would not be subject to a parliamentary review process and report only to the 
president.”111 Erdogan and the AKP have repeatedly taken steps to fill the judiciary with 
loyalists to reduce the capacity of the judiciary to challenge their agenda and to restructure 
the judiciary to increase their dominance over judicial appointments. As result, a key check 
and balance on executive and legislative power has been dismantled and brought under the 
orbit of executive power.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the fifteen years since Erdogan and the AKP came to power, they have 
incrementally and purposefully eroded key checks and balances in the Turkish political 
system to favor the executive. Changes made with regard to the parliamentary system, the 
authorities of the president, and the independence of the judiciary served as a one-way 
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street shifting power into a single office and transformed Turkey into an executive-style 
presidency with Erdogan at its head. Opposing Erdogan became synonymous with plotting 
a coup,112 and the extent to which opposition was treated as treasonous touched even 
Erdogan’s inner circle. As Erdogan’s number two, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, grew 
into an increasingly visible household name both domestically and overseas, and Erdogan 
found this challenged his monopoly on power.113 In May 2016, at the request of Erdogan, 
Prime Minister Davutoglu resigned.114  
Throughout this transformation, Erdogan has made his feelings on the Turkish 
political system known. “In 2012, Erdogan complained about the separation of powers, 
which he described as ‘an obstacle’ to be overcome. ‘You find yourself confronted by 
judges in places where you least expect it,’ he complained.”115 Efforts by the courts to close 
the AKP intensified Erdogan’s campaign to delegitimize and destabilize the historical rival 
institution and by hollowing out the judiciary, Erdogan has changed basic paradigms about 
a well-respected Turkish institution. “Turkish courts have always acted in the service of 
state power, but Erdogan has eliminated even the pretense of prosecutorial or judicial 
independence.”116 These changes along with similar erosions to executive and legislative 
authority eliminate checks and balances make Erdogan the most powerful politician in 
Turkey since the country became a multiparty democracy in 1950.117  
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CHAPTER 3: MR. COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 
In the ninety-five years since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, there have 
been four military coups to remove sitting governments and until the July 2016 coup 
attempt each of these interventions successfully brought a change in political leadership. 
The formulation of civil-military relations in Turkey was established under Ataturk and 
designates the military as “guardians of Turkey’s secularism”118 tasked with checking the 
government when it fails to uphold basic tenets of the Turkish Constitution. With such a 
mandate, the military has historically resisted subordinating its institutions to civilian 
leadership and the military often reaffirmed its autonomy and independence after a coup. 
The military interventions in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997, “aimed at protecting the republic 
from what the generals saw as the harmful intentions of Turkish politicians. In the eyes of 
the Turkish public, the military has long enjoyed a privileged status as the guardians of 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s vision of a secular Turkish nation-state.”119 As an institution that 
has functioned historically without much civilian oversight, the extent to which the Turkish 
military has been subordinated to civilian leadership, and in particular to President 
Erdogan, is unprecedented. “Erdogan’s long tenure seems to have altered past patterns of 
Turkey’s civil-military relations,”120 and this represents a significant erosion of an 
institution competing for power in the republic.  
The failure of the July 2016 coup attempt and the subsequent expansive purges and 
reforms of the military represent a turning point in the history of civil-military relations in 
the Turkish Republic. Whereas previous coup attempts were largely successful and led the 
military to expand their autonomy by passing new laws and regulations,121 the events of 
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July 2016 demonstrated the power of the executive had grown significantly vis-à-vis the 
military and for the first time in the history of the republic, the civilian leadership withstood 
a coup attempt by the military and remained in power. Under emergency law in the months 
following the failed coup attempt, numerous structural reforms to the military conducted 
without judicial or legislative oversight further brought the military under the control of 
the civilian government, but the balance of power between the military and the government 
had been in flux since Erdogan and the AKP came to power in 2002.  
Today, President Erdogan holds a novel position: Commander in Chief of the 
Turkish Armed Forces. Following fifteen years of corrosive civil-military relations, 
President Erdogan “is now the first Turkish head of state to be truly vested with the powers 
outlined in Articles 104 and 117 of the Turkish Constitution. Those provisions make 
Erdogan the commander in chief (on behalf of the Grand National Assembly) and allow 
him to ‘decide on the use of the Turkish Armed Forces,’ NATO’s second-largest 
military.”122 The practical implications of this shift are already impacting the region and 
Erdogan “has availed himself of those powers liberally, having ordered Turkish planes, 
tanks, and troops into battle in Syria twice over the last 18 months.”123 Erdogan stands in 
complete control of Turkish military involvement in the efforts to quell the PKK and ISIS, 
and the transformation of the Turkish Armed Forces from an autonomous institution to one 
under complete civilian control has disrupted chains of command and sown division and 
competition in the newly politicized institution.124  
Whereas Turkey’s military leaders previously rarely made public appearances at 
political events, in August 2016 the country’s Chief of General Staff, the highest-ranking 
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military officer in the Turkish Armed Forces, General Hulusi Akar appeared in uniform at 
a rally of more than a million people in Istanbul alongside President Erdogan, Prime 
Minister Binali Yildirim, and the leaders of the Turkish opposition.125 The general thanked 
Turkey’s civilians for their role in helping to quash the July 2016 coup attempt and through 
repeated interruptions for applause he reassured the crowds that the ‘traitors’ involved in 
the coup attempt would be punished harshly.126 “The vision of united among the people, 
the military, and elected officials presented at the rally stood in sharp contrast to the bloody 
images that emerged after July’s unrest, which showed soldiers lynched by crowds and 
generals tortured by the police.”127 In this instance the imagery of the military uniform was 
coopted for political purposes, and this represents the larger transformation undertaken to 
erode the autonomy and power of the Turkish Armed Forces.  
Alternatively, other symbolic representations of military power have removed the 
military uniform from the equation. Historically, at NATO ministerial meetings the Turkish 
Chief of General Staff always sat beside the defense minister in accordance with protocol. 
From the Turkish perspective, it was odd for military officers from other NATO member 
countries to sit behind their civilian leadership because the Turkish minister of national 
defense held no authority over the military command.128 “While both were formally 
subordinate to the civilian prime minister, the men in uniform didn’t always act that 
way.”129 In bringing the military under executive control, the Chief of General Staff is now 
formally subordinate to the defense minister, thereby implying that the men in uniform 
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now sit behind the defense minister in an apt representation of the manner in which civil-
military relations have fundamentally changed. 
While the degree of erosion of military autonomy has accelerated significantly 
since the July 2016 coup attempt, efforts to consolidate civilian control over the military 
began much earlier and date to the rise of the AKP. This campaign primarily utilized 
structural reforms, show trials, and purges to weaken the military. The justifications for 
reforms have varied since 2002, however Erdogan and the AKP have systematically 
diminished the independence and autonomy of the military for the purpose of consolidating 
their own power. The precedent of four civilian governments removed by the military 
informed the AKP’s strategy to target an institution with the power to remove them from 
office. “Past Turkish administrations had to live in check by a once-powerful military elite 
that saw itself as the guardian of secularism and had a long history of successful coups. But 
years of purges and reform under Mr. Erdogan have dented the military’s power, and the 
failure of last year’s coup attempt damaged the army’s cohesion and prestige while 
furnishing Mr. Erdogan’s own reputation.”130 In the process, the AKP reconstructed basic 
paradigms of civil-military relations in Turkey.  
 
COMPETING FOR POWER 
 Tensions between Erdogan and the military predate the AKP’s first electoral victory 
in 2002. For a brief period in the mid- to late-1990s, Turkey experienced an Islamist 
moment. Erdogan was elected mayor of Istanbul and encouraged imposing sharia and 
banning alcohol sales in municipality-owned facilities. He was a member of the Welfare 
Party (in Turkish the RP), which in the 1995 national election won the highest share of the 
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vote, and its party leader, Necmettin Erbakan, became the prime minister in a coalition 
government the following year.131 In 1997, the involvement of the Turkish Armed Forces 
in politics reached its highest level and the National Security Council signed a 
memorandum asserting the coalition led by the pro-Islamic Welfare Party was undermining 
the secular pillar of the Turkish Republic.132 The military did not deploy but it did mobilize 
women’s organizations, academics, cosmopolitan elites, the media, and big business to 
destabilize and delegitimize the RP-led government,133 and the supportive reaction from 
virtually all segments of society compelled the government to resign.134  
 The 1997 “soft coup” by memorandum led the Turkish Constitutional Court to shut 
down the RP and banned Erbakan from politics for five years. As a junior party member, 
Erdogan was spared but upon reading a nationalist poem at a rally later that year, the mayor 
of Istanbul was charged with “inciting the people to religious hatred”, was convicted, and 
spent four months in jail.135 The poem included the line: “The mosques are our barracks, 
the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets, and the faithful our soldiers,”136 and 
despite its generally nationalist tone, Erdogan’s recitation was regarded as a provocation 
because the words were uttered by an Islamist politician.137 As result of his conviction, 
Erdogan was barred from holding political office, but nevertheless, he helped to form a 
new, slightly more moderate political movement, the Virtue Party (or FP). In 2001, the 
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Virtue Party was also shut down by the Constitutional Court for identifying too closely 
with Erbakan and Islamist policies that ran counter to the Republic’s staunch secularism.138  
 Erdogan’s paranoia with regard to the military is “compounded by the fact that the 
military high command and the Constitutional Court shuttered four of the AKP’s 
predecessor parties between 1971 and 2001 for anti-secular activities.”139 Islamist 
politicians were periodically banned from politics, and Erdogan himself served prison time 
for reading an “Islamist” poem. In successfully waging the 1997 coup without firing shots, 
the military demonstrated its massive political influence and inspired Erdogan to retool his 
next political project, the AKP, so that it might be able to withstand the military’s influence 
on politics.  
 
INITIATING “CIVILIANIZATION” 
In 2003, the AKP came to power on a pro-European integration platform, but efforts 
by Turkey to join the European Union significantly predate the rise of the AKP. In 1963, 
Turkey signed an association agreement with the European Economic Community and 
hoped to join Europe and fulfill the secularizing and modernizing reforms of Ataturk. At 
the time Turkey featured some democratic practices like a multi-party system, but it had 
recently experienced that first of four military coups that would unseat governments in the 
next 35 years.140 Talks of integration “advanced at a glacial pace” due to “the ambivalence 
of European leaders leery of a country where the rule of law was weak and the human 
rights were routinely violated… that lagged behind European levels of socio-economic 
development and that was overwhelming Muslim.”141 Following a breakthrough Customs 
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Union agreement in 1996, both parties agreed in 2001 to the Ascension Partnership for 
Turkey laying out a cooperative framework for Turkey to eventually join the European 
Union as member state. Per the terms of the framework, Turkey’s parliament initiated in 
2002 three “harmonization” packages that made key changes to aspects of the penal code, 
criminal procedure, and anti-terror law, abolished the death penalty, permitted broadcasts 
in Kurdish, and strengthened freedom of expression.142  
When Erdogan and the AKP came to power in 2003, the liberalizing trend appeared 
to continue and the AKP-led parliament enacted five reform packages in its first year and 
half in power. Whereas previous Islamist parties had argued against integrating with the 
predominantly Christian Europe, the AKP insisted membership with the EU was consistent 
with their values. As result of Turkey’s reform efforts, the EU recommended that Turkey 
begin membership negotiations, however, because the EU assessed that Turkey had taken 
vital steps toward fulfilling their requirements for negotiation but had not totally fulfilled 
them, the EU began membership negotiations while anticipating further reform steps along 
the process.143 After negotiations began in 2005, they slowed almost immediately due to 
European ambivalence about the prospect of Turkey joining as a full member.144  
As part of the larger reforms enacted by Turkey during negotiations to join the 
European Union, the government issued reforms to bring the military closer to civilian 
control in a move that was characterized as democratization. According to liberal, 
democratic principles exercised widely across the European Union, “elected civilian 
officials must be supreme over the military,” and Erdogan and the AKP received extensive 
support from the West for changes meant to civilianize the Turkish Armed Forces.145 As 
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part of the reforms, “shortly after coming to power, Erdogan placed the military’s influence 
over governmental affairs on the chopping block,” and he considered reshaping the 
National Security Council, “which was headed by the military and had sole responsibility 
for drafting Turkey’s national-security and foreign-policy doctrines, which it passed to the 
government for implementation.”146 The reforms reduced the role of the National Security 
Council to an advisory role, the composition of the State Security Court was amended to 
include a civilian judge, and the state of emergency was gradually lifted.147 Additionally, 
the secretary general of the NSC, a post traditionally filled by an army general, was 
replaced by a civilian appointed by the president from a list approved by the prime 
minister.148 The effect on the NSC was negligible because it retained control of the 
bureaucratic apparatus of the NSC, however efforts by the AKP to alter relations between 
the elected civilian leaders and the officer corps were strongly endorsed by the West 
because the reforms brought the military’s relations with civilian leaders into line with 
European norms.149  
Contrary to Western expectations, the steps taken by Erdogan and the AKP to 
civilianize the military did not lead to democratization. “Instead of fostering democratic 
consolidation, as many scholars of Turkey expected, these shifts fueled the rise of a 
competitive authoritarian regime dominated by the AKP.”150 Despite liberal democratic 
principles favoring civilian control over the military, the campaign to civilianize the 
Turkish Armed Forces shifted power from a competing state institution to the government 
and thus, represented the erosion of a key check on governmental power. The Turkish 
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political system seemed atypical in regards to the degree to which the military influenced 
politics, particularly through the use of military coups meant to reset politics when it 
deviated from the principles of the Turkish Constitution, and coups d’état are by definition 
illiberal, however, the military’s prestigious status as guardians of secularism and its ability 
to remove governments from power made it a critical check and balance. As discussed 
earlier, the Turkish political system featured only two state institutions capable of checking 
government power: the military and the judiciary. In seeking to curb the military’s control 
over civilian government, Erdogan and the AKP sought to weaken a key competing 
institution for power.  
 
THE TURNING POINT 
After reducing the military’s control over civilian government, Erdogan and the 
AKP moved to eliminate the military’s actual power in politics. After four years of 
worsening relations, the AKP and the military headed into a full-blown standoff. In April 
2007, the AKP nominated Abdullah Gul to be president. The move outraged and alarmed 
secularists because Gul’s wife wore a hijab and argued against the controversial headscarf 
ban and therefore the secularists considered Gul an unfit head of state.151  
 
The nomination prompted the most significant political crisis in Turkey 
since the 1997 “soft coup.” On April 27, 2007, the TAF responded to Gul’s 
nomination by issuing an online press release, which would come to be 
known as the “e-memorandum.” In it, the military reiterated its role as the 
guardians of secularism and threatened “certain groups” who were working 
to undercut Turkey’s secular principles. In past showdowns between the 
government and the TAF, such as the 1971 coup by memorandum, the 
former had bowed down to the latter’s threats; disputes between Islamists 
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and the TAF had historically ended similarly, such as when Erbakan 
abdicated in 1997.152 
According to precedent, the military’s memorandum should have caused Erdogan and the 
AKP to fold almost immediately. However, in this critical moment Erdogan sensed his 
party’s popularity and how Turkey had changed dramatically in his five years in power and 
he refused to be intimidated by the military.153 “Armed with much wider and deeper 
popular support than Erbakan, and being a more skilled political player,” Erdogan stood 
his ground and “the military failed to take any further action in blocking Erdogan or Gul’s 
nomination, and Erdogan was able to present the armed forces, traditionally considered the 
most powerful institution in the country, as a paper tiger.” 154 In the months following, 
Erdogan called for new elections and the AKP won 47 percent of the vote. With a renewed 
popular mandate, Erdogan and the AKP nominated Gul to be Turkey’s 11th president and 
cemented their victory over the military.155 The victory and the AKP’s increased majority 
in parliament “was interpreted as a response of citizens to military intervention in 
politics.”156 The military’s capitulation marked a turning point in the institution’s political 
influence and emboldened Erdogan and the AKP in their mission to weaken checks on their 
power.  
 Transitions in power between Erdogan and the military began to accelerate 
dramatically after the Gul nomination concession, which is why 2007 marks “the beginning 
of the end of TAF’s dominance in Turkey.”157 In the midst of the showdown over Gul’s 
nomination, the Istanbul police uncovered an alleged plot to overthrow the government in 
what became known as the Ergenekon case. Throughout an investigation and trial lasting 
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from 2007 to 2013, the investigation “promised to root out Turkey’s ‘deep state’—an 
alleged network of military, intelligence, and civilian officials along with policemen, 
journalists, academics, business people, and mafia figures. Working in the shadows and 
beyond the law, the group’s goal was, Turks believed, to subvert the government and any 
centers of power that would challenge ‘the system’ and this coalition’s interests in it.”158 
The “deep state” is a powerful social, cultural, and political dimension of how Turks 
perceive events and its strength as a network may be exaggerated or utilized as a political 
scapegoat, however, the AKP appears interested not in dismantling the actual deep state 
but rather in taking control over it.159  
 In part, Erdogan and the AKP were able to utilize the Ergenekon trial to target the 
military because it had a key strategic ally in the Gulenists, whose leader Fetullah Gulen 
fled into exile in the West due to fears over the military. Together, the AKP and Gulenists 
collaborated “to decapitate the armed forces through spectacular show trials based on 
fabricated evidence.”160 While the evidence forming the basis of the coup plot was 
eventually reexamined, the alleged schemes uncovered in the investigation seemed entirely 
plausible given Turkey’s long history of coups. The scope of the case was widespread, but 
it particularly affected the Turkish Armed Forces because the case argued the secularist 
army planned to carry out the alleged coup plot. “In the ensuing witch-hunt, a quarter of 
the country’s admirals and generals were jailed. But the Ergenekon case also targeted the 
government’s secularist opponents, media and civil society, including scholars and 
journalists.”161 Erdogan detained 31 retired military officials and at least initially, partial 
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evidence in the form of weapons caches and contingency plans in a 2004 war game for a 
coup against the government garnered strong public support for the trials.162   
 The show trials expanded between 2008 and 2011 with the Sledgehammer trials. 
“Some six hundred people were convicted in the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials, 
including scores of senior generals in the Turkish military and several prominent 
journalists. About two hundred were sentenced to long prison terms, many in cases 
presided over by judges thought to be loyal to Gulen.”163 Despite shaky evidence, by 2012 
“some fifteen percent of the active admirals and generals in the Turkish armed forces 
[were] on trial for conspiring to overthrow the government.”164 The indictments claimed 
the coup plot was so sophisticated and well-hidden because of the involvement of the deep 
state, which eschewed transparency, that it could not be proven. Notwithstanding the flimsy 
evidence used, the Ergenekon-Sledgehammer trials effectively crippled the military.165 The 
Turkish Armed Forces suffered decreasing prestige and weakening unity as former high-
ranking generals accused each other publicly of participating in the alleged coup plot. 
According to a public survey conducted in April 2013, 50.1 percent of the population 
indicated that “their trust in the armed forces [was] affected negatively by the Ergenekon 
and Sledgehammer cases.”166 In seizing upon a perceived threat, Erdogan and the AKP 
acted to diminish the prestige and fragment the unity of one of its key rivals.  
 As result, a palpable shift in power took place. As Yusuf Kanli, a Turkish journalist 
described: “‘It seems that, in the past, when the military expressed dissatisfaction with the 
government, the government would leave. Nowadays, when the government expresses 
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displeasure to the top generals, the top generals are leaving. There is a change in roles.’”167 
The Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases were pivotal moments in the undermining of the 
Turkish Armed Forces. The secular elite was “completely vitiated” after the trials.168 
Approximately half of Turkey’s admirals, considered “the backbone of the 1997 ‘soft 
coup,’” were jailed and by July 2011 the top brass including the commanders of the Turkish 
ground, naval, and air forces resigned.169 
 The legacy of the Ergenekon trial was twofold: it eroded the Turkish Armed Forces 
in terms of personnel, prestige, unity, and public support and it cemented Erdogan and the 
AKP’s power over the military. “By the time a Turkish court overturned all 275 Ergenekon 
convictions in 2016, it didn’t matter: The damage to institutions was done, and Erdogan 
had consolidated his grip on power.”170 Whereas the military had the power to remove 
prime ministers in the past, they were no longer in a positon to do so.171 Furthermore, the 
show trials “permeated Turkish politics, producing the idea that opposing Erdogan equaled 
plotting coups.”172 This pivotal moment represented a fundamental power shift that 
initiated a new chapter in Turkish civil-military relations. 
 
THE COUP ATTEMPT 
  Around 10 p.m. on July 15th, 2016, elements of the Turkish Armed Forces 
launched simultaneous raids in Ankara and Istanbul. The skies over Ankara were overtaken 
by Turkish Air Force fighter jets and Turkish Army tanks halted traffic on bridges across 
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Istanbul.173 The parliament building in Ankara was bombed in the city’s first direct military 
attack in more than 600 years, and the fighter jets over Istanbul purposefully flew at low 
altitudes and high speeds to generate terrorizing supersonic booms that created the false 
impression that the city was being bombed.174 The raids meant to seize the General Staff 
Headquarters in Ankara, a police special-forces base near the capital, military high schools, 
the Istanbul airport, Istanbul’s city hall, the national public-broadcasting system, and key 
facilities controlling the national telecommunications and satellite systems.  
Within an hour Prime Minister Binali Yildirim condemned the “insurrection” on a 
mainstream news network and just after midnight, President Erdogan appeared live via 
Facetime another network to reassure supporters.175 The breaking news headline read 
“Conflicting reports from army groups and government over who is in control of 
Turkey,”176 and as Erdogan addressed the public, he charged that a minority within the 
military led by Fethullah Gulen and his supporters “was trying to override the people’s will 
and ‘invade’ Turkey.”177 In response, he called on citizens to rally in the streets and to take 
back the airport. Additionally, he called upon mosques to urge resistance to the coup and 
over eighty-thousand mosques across Turkey issued religious calls to prayer for hours that 
night, thus utilizing state religious authority to assist in quelling the coup. Thousands of 
people in Istanbul and Ankara poured into the streets and placed themselves in front of the 
tanks.178  
 The coup failed within hours. Condemnations from within the military appeared in 
the early hours of the coup as the commander of the First Army in Istanbul publicly spoke 
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out against it.179 Only one television channel was captured and the mass mobilization of 
citizens in the streets garnered mixed reactions from the coup plotters ranging from soldiers 
giving up their weapons rather than shooting civilians to soldiers fatally shooting or 
running civilians over with tanks. Erdogan avoided capture, and by the early morning hours 
of July 16th, it became apparent that the majority of the military was not behind nor in 
support of the coup. The crowds soon defeated the coup plotters and hundreds of soldiers 
surrendered and a number where captured by police.180 By far Turkey’s bloodiest coup, the 
official death toll stated a total of 161 civilians and 104 coup supporters were killed in the 
clashes.181 
 When the clashes ended, mass arrests began and they specifically targeted the Air 
Force and Gendarmerie for their participation in the coup. As the arrested demonstrated, 
the Chief of the General Staff, Hulusi Akar, and other top military commanders had denied 
the coup plotters, who were mostly brigadier generals and colonels, their support.182 
Critically, “almost half of all the brigadiers involved in the coup attempt had been 
appointed after 2013, following the purges of secular-Kemalist senior officers during the 
Ergenekon and Balyoz (Sledgehammer) cases.”183 The involvement of only part of the 
military breaks with the tradition of previous military coups and signals “serious rifts in an 
organization that, through earlier coups, bitter counterinsurgency and the Ergenekon 
tragedy, maintained solidarity. And yet another blow to the cohesion of the state and 
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society, this event will erode governmental and public support for what was once Turkey’s 
most trusted and united institution.”184  
The popular uprising against the military coup illustrated a recent seismic shift in 
public support for the institution. A World Values Survey taken just before the 1997 coup 
found that “ninety-five percent of Turks trusted their military,” and a 2015 Pew poll taken 
in the run-up to national elections “found that only fifty-two percent of Turks gave the 
military a positive rating.”185 Declining public support for the military contributed to the 
coup failing, but aspects of the coup plot itself reveal the extent to which Erdogan’s efforts 
to delegitimize and destabilize the military succeeded. The coup plotters were unable to 
build a wide coalition within the Turkish Armed Forces or within other segments of society 
(as was the case in the 1997 coup) that supported the coup. In the absence of a contingent 
of military leaders taking credit for the coup, Erdogan is pushing aggressively pursuing a 
narrative blaming his most recent rivals, the Gulenists, that is backed up by testimonies 
from General Akar and several confessions that implicate the Gulen movement and 
Fethullah Gulen.186  
 
COUNTERING THE FAILED COUP D’ÉTAT  
In the aftermath of the failed coup attempt, Erdogan and the AKP exploited 
remarkably similar tactics in their mission to erode the judiciary and the military: purges 
and constitutional reforms. The massive and widespread purges especially targeted the 
institution responsible for undertaking the coup attempt (in this case, the military), and the 
scale of personnel upended affected Turkey’s ability to effectively coordinate in active 
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military missions such as the coalition to defeat ISIS.187 As witnessed in the purges of the 
judiciary, the purges of the military created vast opportunities to remove those perceived 
to be dissidents or opponents (in this case, Gulenists) and to replace them with loyalists, 
thereby eroding a competing institution for power and transforming it into a support base 
for Erdogan and the AKP.  
Within a month of the failed coup attempt, 10,012 soldiers were detained and 
roughly half of all top generals and admirals were jailed or dismissed.188 In some cases, 
generals were arrested or fired for being too slow to come out in support of Erdogan.189 
Over 5,000 army officials were initially sent to pretrial detention and by April 2017 that 
number had grown to 8,000 army officers.190 The scale of the purges “have also called the 
military’s strength into question… The mass cleansings of the officer corps have led to 
reported shortages of trained pilots, gendarmes, and other security officials throughout the 
country.”191 In relieving so many generals of their posts, the purges hampered Turkey’s 
coordination efforts with NATO. By October 2016, of the fifty Turkish military staffers in 
NATO headquarters in Belgium, only nine remained.192  
 Additionally, Erdogan and the AKP made several institutional changes in the 
months following the coup attempt including placing the Coast Guard and the internal 
security force, the gendarmerie, under the Ministry of the Interior, and subordinating the 
army, air force, and navy to the Ministry of Defense. The government closed Turkey’s 
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military schools and passed reforms allowing graduates of the country’s religious schools 
to enter the armed forces.193 “The hasty institutional changes… are likely to disrupt the 
chains of command, sowing division and competition in the ranks. In the longer term, 
Erdogan’s plan… to fill its institutions with government loyalists could politicize the 
officer corps and de-professionalize the army. At the moment, the army is too weak to 
resist those changes or to otherwise preserve its autonomy.”194 Erdogan faces a challenge 
in whittling away the military’s autonomy without compromising its effectiveness. “On the 
one hand, the president must rebuild a broken army into a strong and well-respected 
institution that can project power and meet security challenges ranging from Kurdish 
separatism to the terrorism of the so-called Islamic State, or ISIS. On the other, he has to 
ensure that the military will submit to his own authority.”195 The coup attempt has not 
slowed or reduced Turkey’s military involvement domestically or regionally as Erdogan 
has sought to demonstrate Turkey’s military effectiveness in Syria.  
 While Erdogan used his authority during the state of emergency to strengthen his 
grip on the military, several amendments in the 2017 constitutional referendum aimed to 
institutionalize further changes to the military. First, modifications to Article 142 on the 
formation of courts limits the conditions in which military courts can be used to matters 
involving military discipline or to times of war. Essentially, this abolishes military courts 
and brings officers and civilians under the same judicial system.196 Second, performance 
of military service would no longer be a requirement for parliamentary candidates.197 As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, the two constitutionally mandated military judges would be 
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eliminated from the Constitutional Court. Lastly, “the military, for the first time, would 
also be subject to investigation from the State Supervisory Council, and Inspector General-
like institution appointed by and attached to the presidency—an important step that would 
put the military on par with other executive branch agencies.”198 Collectively, the actions 
decrease the role of the military in Turkish politics and bring the institution further under 
the control of the judiciary and government—two bodies already controlled by Erdogan.  
 Since the failed coup attempt, Turkey has functioned under emergency law and this 
is unique in two ways: application and duration. “The military has declared states of 
emergency several times in Turkey’s history, through usually after actual coups, not failed 
ones. Even if the aftermath of earlier coups saw greater violence- more torture, more 
hangings- there was the promise of an end. Martial law could be expected to come to a 
close; free elections would be held.”199 Erdogan declared a state of emergency after a failed 
coup attempt that ended quickly and furthermore, he has repeatedly extended the state of 
emergency. Initially, the state of emergency was introduced as a temporary measure, but 
Erdogan stated in a May 2017 speech that the state of emergency will continue until the 
country achieved “‘welfare and peace.’”200 Speaking to state-owned news, Erdogan 
reiterated: “‘In my country, they tried to overthrow the state, and we gave 249 martyrs, and 
had 2,193 injured… How dare you ask us to lift the state of emergency.’”201 He gave the 
speech at a conference in which he formally reaccepted his position as AKP party leader,202 
thus enjoying his newly approved authorities.   
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CONCLUSIONS 
Through a campaign of structural reforms, show trials, and purges, Erdogan and the 
AKP undermined the independence of the Turkish Armed Forces and systematically 
utilized a variety of narratives to bring the military under civilian control. Initially, the 
reforms were framed as “democratization” and were strongly endorsed by the European 
Union as part of Turkey’s steps towards membership. Liberal principles promote civilian 
control over the military, however, in taking steps to civilianize the military, Erdogan 
sought to weaken an adversary rather than democratize Turkey. In the 1990s, while serving 
as mayor of Istanbul, Erdogan “declared… that democracy was ‘a vehicle, not a goal,’ 
implying that one could disembark whenever it suited one’s purposes.”203 With a tepid 
commitment at best to democracy, the early AKP constitutional reforms seemed to indicate 
a more democratic Turkey, however, as this chapter demonstrates, characterizations of 
Erdogan’s early steps to bring the Turkish Armed Forces under civilian control as 
“democratizing” need reexamining. Rather than supporting the “Turkish model” for 
democracy in the Middle East, these efforts unveil how “democratic” reforms were 
weaponized to erode competing institutions for power and to eliminate potential checks on 
the government. Erdogan and the AKP moved to diminish the political influence of the 
military, thereby reducing the military’s capacity to unseat their government.  
In as early as 2009, the changes undertaken in civil-military relations seemed to 
represent a new chapter of executive power. As Erdogan spearheaded legislation subjecting 
active-duty soldiers to review by civilian courts for crimes not related to their military 
duties, scholars began to question the capacity of the military to continue to check Erdogan. 
“The days of military coups are likely over, partly because the country has become far 
more diverse and complex and power is now more diffuse, and partly because of these 
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AKP-led reforms.”204 As not only one of two key institutions capable of competing with 
the executive, but also the second largest army in NATO, the destabilization of the Turkish 
Armed Forces radiates outward in the region and had led relations with NATO to sour 
during an active joint coordinated effort to defeat ISIS. Turkey faces military conflicts with 
ISIS and the PKK and increasing military interventions in Iraq and Syria, and while the 
Turkish Armed Forces have begun to replenish its ranks, the composition of the military 
looks to predominantly favor Erdogan loyalists who are unlikely seek to remove him from 
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS 
After fifteen years in power, Erdogan’s reign in Turkey may only be reaching its 
halfway point. Changes made under the AKP might allow Erdogan to remain in power 
until 2034 and given how he has fundamentally restructured the Turkish political system 
since winning the ballot box, there is precedent for him to alter the rules again so that he 
remains in power for the rest of his life. Upon examining how Erdogan and the AKP utilize 
state institutions to consolidate power in the executive, a pattern of methods arises. First, 
Erdogan capitalized on EU-endorsed reforms and weaponized them to erode a competing 
institution for power—the military, and to eliminate potential checks on the executive. 
Second, a series of constitutional referendums and reforms culminating in the 2017 
constitutional referendum sought to formally reshape the political system and to achieve 
Erdogan’s end goal—an executive-style presidency with himself in full control of state 
resources and authorities. Third, massive purges in the judiciary and the military allowed 
Erdogan and the AKP to fundamentally alter the composition of two key checks on 
executive power and to replace the ranks of opponents and even potential opponents with 
loyalists.  
Collectively, these methods characterize the manner in which Erdogan has 
consolidated power in Turkey since 2003 and they also highlight the need to reexamine 
“democratizing” characterizations of Erdogan’s early steps to bring the Turkish Armed 
Forces under civilian control. When considered in the context of Turkey, these reforms 
demonstrate how Erdogan utilized state capacity to consolidate power in Turkey 
incrementally and purposefully with little regard for democratic principles and while rarely 
enjoying a popular mandate endorsed by over half the voting population.  
 56 
Today Erdogan holds all the major offices of power simultaneously: president, 
commander-in-chief, and head of the party, thereby leaving no space for opponents. To 
oppose Erdogan is to commit treason. There have been moments of weakness including 
the June 2015 elections that saw AKP dominance slip, however Erdogan proved himself a 
shrewd politician by calling for new elections in November 2015 and regaining all of the 
AKP’s lost seats after a massive crackdown campaign targeting the HDP opposition 
party.206 But the victory of the “yes” vote in the 2017 constitutional referendum rooted 
Erdogan’s power in the very foundations of the state and represents a consolidation of 
power that is unprecedented.207 As Erdogan orchestrated a systematic concentration of 
authority in his office, he built one-way roads transferring power from the parliamentary 
system, the judiciary, and the military and all the roads led to President Erdogan. While 
Erdogan may have held “de facto” executive-style presidential power in the year prior to 
the referendum,208 the changes coming into effect in 2019 reshape the Turkish political 
system in Erdogan’s image.  
Erdogan began the game of political survival in 2003 and came into office acutely 
aware of which institutions could unseat him: the judiciary and the military. Informed by 
their history of confrontation and the genealogy of the AKP as an Islamist party, Erdogan 
and the AKP acted to protect their political livelihoods by eroding these key checks on 
government power. They enacted a targeted campaign to shift authorities to state 
institutions under their control and eventually to just one office—the president. Steven 
Cook argues that Erdogan is not the root of all Turkey’s troubles, and that an underlying 
and deep-seated cycle of repression and rage characterizes the AKP as making a mark, but 
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by “substituting old authoritarian institutions for ones of his own.”209 While he 
characterizes the degree to which Erdogan and the AKP have changed Turkish politics and 
society as limited, from a structural standpoint their impact is clearly significant.  
Furthermore, Cook views the history of military interventions in Turkey as a sign 
of weakness, and challenges presentations of the Turkish Armed Forces as robust by 
arguing rather the military interventions show the profound weakness and fragility of the 
military because it always has to intervene to keep the political system along lines they find 
acceptable.210 Whereas interventions might denote institution fragility, previous 
interventions were at least effective in removing governments from power and the decline 
in the Turkish Armed Forces’s capacity to succeed in a military coup still signals an erosion 
of their authority.  
 Erdogan’s response to the 2016 coup attempt is perhaps most telling of the extent 
to which he has achieved his end goals. As an extraordinarily careful and shrewd politician 
and head of an equally efficient political party, Erdogan was suspected in the days 
following the failed coup attempt of having a playbook in the event of a coup. His 
coordinated and rapid response helped demolish what remained of competing institutions. 
“The military is now Erdogan’s. The military, which up this point has been autonomous 
unto itself, is now in chaos and subject to the control of President Erdogan.”211 Upon 
Erdogan’s triumph return to Istanbul after the failed coup attempt, “he declared the coup 
‘a gift from God… because it will help us claim our military from members of this gang’ 
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[Gulenists].”212 His ability to outmaneuver his opponents calls into question whether any 
institutional check and balance remains in the Turkish political system or whether his 
personal power now exceeds all other authorities. In remaking the state in his image, 
Erdogan and the AKP have played a long game to ensure their political survival and in 
doing so, they have manipulated well-known principles of liberalism and demonstrated that 
“democratic” reforms can be weaponized to erode competing institutions for power and to 
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